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We analyze the security of the two-dimensional circulation encryption algorithm (TDCEA), recently published by Chen et al. in
this journal. We show that there are several flaws in the algorithm and describe some attacks. We also address performance issues
in current cryptographic designs.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In symmetric-key cryptography, two parties share a secret
key K to encrypt messages using a cipher. Symmetric en-
cryption techniques are used to eﬃciently encrypt data. Two
common types of ciphers are commonly used nowadays:
block ciphers and stream ciphers.
Block ciphers encrypt blocks of data (typically 64 or 128
bits) in a fixed key-dependent way. The design of block ci-
phers is a well-studied area of research. The best known block
ciphers are the Data Encryption Standard (DES) [2] and
the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [3]. In the past
decade, many new attacks on block ciphers have emerged,
the most important ones being diﬀerential [4] and linear
[5] cryptanalysis. Diﬀerential cryptanalysis is an example
of a chosen-plaintext attack, while linear cryptanalysis is a
known-plaintext attack. A good design should at least be re-
sistant to these attacks.
Stream ciphers, on the other hand, generate a pseudo-
random key stream independent of the plaintext. This key
stream is then used to encrypt the plaintext character per
character in a time-varying way.
In this paper, we will study the security of the recently
published two-dimensional circulation encryption algo-
rithm (TDCEA) [1]. This design can be seen as a block ci-
pher, but it also has some properties of a stream cipher. It
encrypts blocks of 64 bits at a time by combining each block
with the secret key.
The outline of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we
briefly describe TDCEA. In Section 3, we study the security
of TDCEA. We show several flaws in the algorithm and de-
scribe a known-plaintext attack that breaks the cipher in less
than 10 seconds on a 1.5GHz PC. We also explain why we
believe that it will not be possible to improve the design to
be cryptographically sound, as TDCEA lacks many of the de-
sirable properties of a state-of-the-art symmetric encryption
algorithm. In Section 4, we address the tradeoﬀs that need to
be made between performance and security of a design. We
then discuss the use of concepts from chaos theory in cryp-
tography in Section 5, and conclude in Section 6.
2. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF TDCEA
In this section, we give a brief description of TDCEA. For
a full description, we refer to [1]. The secret key of TDCEA
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consists of a 17-bit value µ (3 < µ < 4), a 17-bit initial state
x(0) (0 < x(0) < 1), and two 3-bit values α and β.1 The plain-
text is encrypted in blocks of 64 bits, which corresponds to
eight pixels. For every block p(i) (i = 0, 1, . . .), we calculate a
new value for the internal state x(0) with the following logis-
tic map:
x(i) = µ · x(i− 1) · (1− x(i− 1)). (1)
The ciphertext c(i) is then obtained by arranging p(i) in a
matrix, and performing rotations on all rows and columns
of this matrix. By how many positions each row and column
is rotated is dependent on α, β, and x(i).
3. SECURITY OF TDCEA
3.1. Flaws of TDCEA
In this section, we list several flaws of TDCEA.
The key of TDCEA is too short
The eﬀective length of the secret key (µ, x(0),α,β) is only 40
bits. Our unoptimized implementation of TDCEA runs at
about 1 million encryptions per second on a 1.5GHz PC.
This means that exhaustive search (trying all possible keys
until the right key is found) takes only about 12 days on a
single PC. On a large cluster of computers, the key can be
found in few minutes. A secret key of at least 80 bits is nowa-
days the minimum requirement for security against exhaus-
tive search. To make matters worse, TDCEA only uses 23 bits
(α, β, and x(i)) to encrypt a plaintext block pi, which makes
divide-and-conquer attacks on the key space possible.
TDCEA only permutes the plaintext
According to the principles of confusion and diﬀusion intro-
duced by Shannon [6], a strong cipher should use a combi-
nation of substitutions and permutations. This can be found
in two popular schemes for block ciphers, namely Feistel net-
works (such as DES) and substitution-permutation networks
(such as AES). However, TDCEA only permutes the values of
8 consecutive pixels. It is easy to see that only permuting an
image will not hide all of its properties. For instance, an en-
tirely white image will remain entirely white after encryption.
Especially pictures with low entropy will still be recognizable
after encryption. We have tried to encrypt such pictures and
in many cases they are still very recognizable after encryp-
tion.
TDCEA is noniterative
When we consider TDCEA as a block cipher, we see that it
consists of operations such as multiplications and rotations,
which are commonly used in block ciphers. In order to re-
sist cryptanalytic attacks, a strong block cipher is built out of
1α and β are used in the algorithm to determine the number of positions
by which an 8-bit word is rotated. Thus the only thing we need to know
about α and β is their value modulo 8.
many iterations of the same function. For instance, DES con-
sists of 16 rounds, and AES consists of 10, 12, or 14 rounds
of the same function, every time with a diﬀerent round key.
TDCEA only consists of one round, which means there is lit-
tle hope it will resist linear and diﬀerential cryptanalysis.
The key distribution of TDCEA is weak
In a good key distribution system, compromise of one ses-
sion key should not compromise the master key. In TDCEA,
a session key is encrypted by an exclusive or with the master
key (see the full description of TDCEA in [1]). This means
that compromise of one single session key will also compro-
mise the master key, and thus all previous and future session
keys.
The logistic map is not a good pseudorandom
number generator
The sequence x(i) becomes quickly periodic. Especially for
small values of µ, this is a problem as the period will be very
small and an attacker will observe repetition in the permu-
tation used in diﬀerent blocks. For instance, for µ between
3 and 3.45, the logistic map will oscillate between just two
values.
3.2. Known-plaintext attack on TDCEA
The authors claim that TDCEA resists a known-plaintext at-
tack. We will now show that this is not correct by describ-
ing an algorithm that breaks TDCEA with only 24 known-
plaintext bytes, which is equivalent to three known-plaintext
blocks.
The attacker has at his disposal three plaintext blocks p0,
p1, and p2, and the corresponding ciphertexts c0, c1, and c2.
We use the fact that TDCEA only uses 23 bits (α, β, and x(i))
to encrypt a plaintext block pi (cf. Section 3). The attacker
now proceeds as follows to recover the plaintext.
Step 1. The attacker encrypts the plaintext p0 by trying all
values for α, β, and x(0). This means trying 223 ≈ 8 400 000
possibilities, which requires a few seconds on a PC. He then
checks whether the obtained ciphertext is equal to the actual
ciphertext c0. If this is the case, he has found a valid guess αg ,
βg , and x(0)g . One typically obtains very few valid guesses: 4
is a typical value.
Step 2. For the valid guesses αg , βg obtained in Step 1, the
attacker now tries all values of x(1) to find those for which p1
encrypts to c1. Again a very small list of possibilities αg , βg ,
and x(1)g is obtained.
Step 3. For the guesses αg , βg valid in both Steps 1 and 2, the
attacker now tries all values of x(2) to find those for which p2
encrypts to c2. Again a very small list of possibilities αg , βg ,
and x(2)g is obtained.
Step 4. The attacker now exhaustively searches the small list
obtained in Steps 1 through 3 for values (x(0)g , x(1)g , x(2)g)
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Considering (1), one can easily see that the guesses
(x(0)g , x(1)g , x(2)g) for which the above equality holds are
with high probability the correct values used in TDCEA, that
the corresponding αg and βg are also the correct values, and
that the fraction in (2) is equal to the secret µ. We have thus
obtained the whole secret key of TDCEA.
This algorithm has been implemented in C on a Xeon
1.5GHz. It breaks TDCEA in less than 10 seconds.
3.3. Further comments on the security of TDCEA
We have investigated whether the basic structure of TDCEA
can be improved so that the algorithm becomes secure.
A first thing that should be done is to increase the key
size of the algorithm to prevent the simple known-plaintext
attack described above. This implies a substantial increase in
the size of the multiplier, which will also aﬀect the speed and
the area required by the encryption algorithm.
However, even a huge secret key will not make the cipher
secure. An essential flaw of TDCEA is the fact that it only per-
mutes the plaintext as noted above. This problem will remain
the same irrespective of the key size. Besides the visible prob-
lems of the algorithm, it is also easy to recover the secret key.
For instance, one can mount a chosen-plaintext attack as fol-
lows: encrypt 8 pixels such that only 1 bit in the circulation
matrix is one and all other bits are zero. In the ciphertext,
we can see where this bit ended up and thus we know how
it has been rotated. As this rotation is directly dependent on
the key, this gives us information on the secret key. Working
in this way, it will be easy to collect enough information to
recover the entire key.
As explained in Section 3.1, many other problems will
need to be overcome in order to make the security of TD-
CEA acceptable. We do not believe that it will be possible to
make a secure and eﬃcient algorithm out of the basic build-
ing blocks of TDCEA. We will discuss this further in the next
section.
4. ON THE TRADEOFF BETWEEN PERFORMANCE
AND SECURITY
It is clear that a minimal requirement for a good symmetric-
key algorithm is that it should be secure, as there is no point
in using an insecure encryption algorithm. In practice, it is
required that the algorithm have a suﬃciently large secret key
and that there is no attack on the algorithm faster than ex-
haustive search. For instance, the five block ciphers selected
for the final of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) de-
velopment eﬀort [7] fulfill this requirement for 128-bit, 192-
bit, and 256-bit keys.
To be used in practice, an algorithm should also have a
good performance in various applications. In software, this
is expressed in the number of cycles the processor needs to
encrypt a byte of plaintext (cycles/byte). In hardware, good
performance is a combination of high throughput and low
gate count.
Rijndael, the algorithm that has been selected as the AES,
achieves very good performance in both software and hard-
ware. Moreover, the design can be implemented in hardware
either with a very low gate count and with a more than rea-
sonable throughput (e.g., [8] describes an ASIC implemen-
tation using 5400 gates and encrypting 300Mbps) or op-
timized for speed and thus heavily pipelined (e.g., [9] de-
scribes an ASIC implementation using 173 000 gates and en-
crypting 2290Mbps). The AES is a cost-eﬀective practical so-
lution that can be used inmost applications, certainly includ-
ing multimedia data transmission.
In some rare cases where a very low gate count combined
with a high throughput is required, it may not be possible
to use AES. In these cases, as noted in [10], a stream ci-
pher may achieve a better tradeoﬀ between throughput, gate
count, and security. An interesting question is whether the
building blocks of TDCEA could provide a solution in such
cases. TDCEA has two main building blocks, a multiplica-
tion and key-dependent rotations. We will now explain why
these building blocks will not achieve a better tradeoﬀ be-
tween throughput, gate count, and security than Rijndael.
Multiplications are not the best choice in hardware. For
the AES finalists, it has been shown that the block ciphers us-
ing multiplication had a significantly longer critical path and
also needed more area than those not using multiplication
operations; see [11].
The key-dependent rotations of the matrix also will not
oﬀer a good tradeoﬀ. The horizontal and vertical rotations
have to be performed sequentially, which will make the exe-
cution of the algorithm slow compared with other diﬀusion
methods. Moreover, one can note that depending on the se-
cret key, a diﬀerent number of cycles are performed. This fact
will make the system vulnerable to side-channel attacks such
as timing and power analysis; see [12, 13].
5. ON CHAOS THEORY AND CRYPTOGRAPHY
In the past years, many new cryptographic algorithms based
on chaotic concepts have been published. According to Ko-
carev [14], “despite a huge number of papers published in the
field of chaos-based cryptography, the impact that this research
has made on conventional cryptography is rather marginal.”
Indeed, most of these new designs are too slow or inse-
cure. Often they are both insecure and slow. We believe that
this is due to an insuﬃcient knowledge of the state of the art
in cryptanalysis by the designers of such systems, as their de-
signs do not resist the most basic of cryptanalytic attacks.
However, it is possible to use chaotic concepts to build
ciphers that seem to do well on both security and perfor-
mance. For example, the stream cipher Rabbit [15] has a
good performance on a Pentium and the first analysis in-
dicates that it has suﬃcient resistance against cryptanalytic
attacks [16].
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6. CONCLUSION
We have shown several flaws of the TDCEA algorithm and
implemented an attack that breaks the cipher with 24 bytes
of known plaintext. The attack runs in less than 10 seconds
on a PC. TDCEA is thus highly insecure and should not be
used.We have also explained why we believe that the building
blocks of TDCEA are not suitable to achieve a good tradeoﬀ
between security and performance in a state-of-the-art sym-
metric encryption algorithm.
We recommend the use of standard encryption algo-
rithms, such as the Advanced Encryption Standard or the
block ciphers in the NESSIE [17] portfolio, in practical ap-
plications. These standards have undergone an extensive se-
curity analysis, achieve very good tradeoﬀs between perfor-
mance and security, and can be used in almost all applica-
tions.
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